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‘The new constitutionalism’: The global, the 
postcolonial and the constitution of nations 
          
 
PETER FITZPATRICK 
Anniversary Professor of Law, Birkbeck, University of London 
 
To appropriate one’s own time has always been unheard of. But 
everyone can clearly see that it is time: the disaster of 
sovereignty is sufficiently spread out, and sufficiently common, to 




Warily, but I hope not too wearily, I want to return to some old ground in 
constitutional law and question certain distinctions which go to constitute it.2 
These are distinctions between the international and the national, public law 
and private law (a distinction which seems to retain a stronghold on the 
ordering of legal knowledge in South Africa), the distinction between written 
and unwritten constitutions, and the whole divide between what typically goes 
in a constitution and what typically does not. My purpose in departing from 
such distinctions is not simply to better order or disorder our legal knowledge 
                                                 
1 Nancy J-L Being singular plural (trans. Richardson R and O’Byrne A) (2000) 142. 
2 This is an extended and updated version of a keynote talk given at the conference ‘Constitutional law 
and legal theory’ held on 9-10th September 2003 at the University of the Western Cape and hosted by 
the Faculties of Law at the Universities of Cape Town, the Western Cape and Stellenbosch, and by the 
Research Unit for Legal and Constitutional Interpretation. For their unparalled hospitality my thanks go 
to the organisers of the conference, to Jacques De Ville, and to Christa and André van der Walt. The 
intellectual companionship of Stewart Motha has alerted me to much that had to be read or read anew. 
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but, rather, to show how these distinctions increasingly obstruct an adequate 
perception and an adequate response to that which goes to the making, to the 
constituting of constitutions, and thence to the terms of our being together. 
This is a growing inadequacy which is not only legal in the narrow sense but 
political and ontological as well. Broadly, if a constitution, both legally and 
mythically, is to relate somehow to what a people is and to what it is 
becoming, then the constitutional frame as it is usually understood is coming 
to be more and more limited. This is a rash, not to say rude, thesis to advance 
in a country which so recently produced what many would aptly see as the 
most progressive constitution of the twentieth century, but a consolation may 
be that this is a constitution better poised than most to respond to the 
imperatives I will be outlining. 
 
There is, however, a current perspective on constitutions and 
constitutionalism which could be seen as responding more immediately in a 
way to the concerns I have just evoked. This is the ‘new constitutionalism’ 
which several obliging academics now see emerging within international 
treaties and within what were once delimited as economic organisations – the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) being the most juridically explicit carrier of 
this supposed constitutionalism – or these scholars would extract 
constitutional virtue from the nostrums of ‘good governance’ and such 
required by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their 
imposition of ‘conditionalities’ and ‘structural adjustment programmes’, 
sometimes rendered in the apt acronym of SAPs.3 Or there is Hardt and 
 
3 For a critique see Kelsey J ‘Global economic policy-making: A new constitutionalism?’ in Kelsey J 
(ed) International Economic Regulation (2002) 501. The term ‘new constitutionalism’ has been 
influentially used also to describe a perceived increase globally in judicial power, including in South 
Africa: see Hirschl R Towards juristocracy: The origins and consequences of the new constitutionalism 
(2004). 
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Negri’s Empire (2000) with its discovery of an incipient global constitution, an 
emergent juridical world order.4  
 
All of which is not simply to rehearse the worn thesis of the decline of the 
nation state in the advance of globalisation, but it is to subscribe to the more 
astute perception that the global, or the international, and the national are 
mutually formative.5 My concern will be with a consequence of that 
perception, with a certain indistinction between the international and the 
national. That concern extends to how that indistinction constitutes the 
national and the international, although my main focus here will be on the 
national, on the dependent constitution of nation. And, as my incendiary 
epigraph would suggest, a concentration of that focus will be found, 
eventually, in an appropriative sovereignty – that sovereignty suscitating the 
national constitution. 
 
The analysis cannot, however, rest content with the constitution of the 
national domain in its relation of indistinction to the international since that 
same analysis reveals that the constituent indistinction is not confinable at all. 
So, the indistinction extends not only to what is nominally outside of the 
national domain but also to what is nominally within it, to what is usually and 
assuredly taken to be within the national domain and subject to its 
constitution. It is here, the nominal within, that an equivalent ‘new 
constitutionalism’ can be found in the ‘new federalism’ in which power is 
transferred from the centre to the federated units, or found in that 
‘asymmetrical federalism’ in which different units assume differential 
 
4 Hardt M and Negri A Empire (2000); and for a critique see Fitzpatrick P ‘The immanence of Empire’ 
in Passavant P and Dean J (eds) Empire’s new clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (2004) 31. 
5 Buchanan R and Pahuja S ‘Legal imperialism: Empire’s invisible hand?’ in Passavant P and Dean J 
(eds) Empire’s new clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (2004) 73. 
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configurations of power within the national domain, or, to take a final example, 
found in the new terms of ‘recognition’ of indigenous groupings.6 The latter 
will provide a telling instance for the South African situation. Thence ensues 
the drama that is the postcolonial sovereignty of South Africa, a drama 
encapsulated in the constitutional blazon of ‘One law for One nation’ – a 
‘drama’ because such a consummation could hardly be more justifiably 
claimed yet more justifiably challenged. 
 
2 CONSTITUTING CONSTITUTIONS 
Some basics to start with, mercifully brief, and trying desperately not to sound 
like the first lecture in Constitutional Law I. In the UK that initial lecture would 
plunge into what the fresh-faced audience must perceive as an arcanum, the 
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions. Both quantitatively 
and, in ways, qualitatively, the unwritten is the marginal category, being 
confined to a few countries and constitutionally underdeveloped. Within the 
conceptual scheme of Constitutional Law, that is a perspective I would want to 
reverse considerably. One way of questioning the claims, especially the 
sovereign foundational claims, of the singular written constitution is to regard 
its variability. The world’s longest constitution – the Indian, although it is now 
almost matched in this by the forlorn draft constitution of the European Union 
–7 seeks a constitutional comprehensiveness but no one would claim that this 
is achieved. It could be contrasted with the Australian which is very short 
indeed and does not cover many matters normally found in written 
 
6 The ‘recognition of indigenous groupings’ will be considerably referenced later. For ‘asymmetrical 
federalism’ a survey can be found in McGarry J ‘Asymmetrical federalism and the plurinational state’, 
a working draft paper available at http://www.federalism2005.be/home/attachment/i/580; and for an 
analysis see Requejo F ‘Cultural pluralism, nationalism and federalism: A revision of democratic 
citizenship in plurinational states’ (1999) 35 European Journal of Political Research 255. For a 
compendious account of the ‘new federalism’ see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_federalism. 
7 See http://europa.eu/constitution/en/allinone_en.htm. Although not adopted as such, the draft 
constitution is obliquely and highly effective. I will return to it shortly. 
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constitutions, such as the composition, even the very presence, of the 
Executive. But no matter how close to complete a written constitution may be, 
in these poststructural times it can hardly be an adventurous observation to 
say that, in its very quality of being in written language, constitutional content 
cannot be referentially enduring or complete. Not only must any claim to a 
contained fixity fail, but that very failure, that lack of and in language, makes 
up the constitutional content itself. Putting it in terms more attuned to the law, 
no law as presently posited can of itself extend determinatively in its 
‘application’. Mercifully for the endurance of the legal profession, that failure of 
application always calls for interpretation and judgement. It calls thence for the 
endowing of law with new content. 
 
The unwritten constitution, the constitution not definitively contained within a 
singular written document, generically accommodates this constituent lack. 
This is something usually associated, in the UK at least, with the constitution 
having something of a foundation in the common law, with the intrinsic 
recognition that all laws are leges temporis, the recognition that law could 
always and infinitely adapt and change in a responsive regard to whatever 
impinged on it. Nonetheless and along with this infinite adaptability, there is 
the continuist assumption underpinning the UK, or really the English, 
constitution, that it has somehow  existed immemorialy, and that it continues 
adaptively to exist, without the nasty, ruptural breaks typifying the 
constitutions of less enlightened climes. What this absence of sharp 
demarcation meant also, as Dicey recognised, was that there could be no 
qualitative distinction between the constitution and the ordinary law.8 The 
obvious problem then becomes not only that the constitution is, in Bentham’s 
 
8 Dicey A Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution 8 ed (1915) 115-7. 
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terms, plunged into ‘the dark Chaos of the Common Law’9 but that there is no 
way of marking apart what may be constitutional and what may not be. Of 
course, there is a historic alternative to this strange Whiggish amnesia which 
the English indulge in. They did have, in the space of one century, not only 
one revolution but two, and it was those very revolutions which set the 
common law in its constitutional or foundational character, and demarcated 
certain matters as constitutional – so much so that ‘the English constitution’ 
became a distinct model for others. What results, in all, is an elegant engine 
having a cohering yet protean being, one which can continuously absorb new 
matter yet somehow remain existent in itself.  
 
The two dimensions extracted from the English constitution conspicuously 
characterise constitutions generally. With one dimension, the constitution is 
seen as performatively constituting an enduring entity, an entity which 
minimally is the government of a ‘people’, giving some ultimately enforceable 
effect to their being together. It is a foundation, a charter voicing an ‘original 
intent’. Often, as in the cases of the English and South African revolutions, it is 
a ‘settlement’ of long-standing conflict. Yet constitutions are equally noted for 
what would seem to be opposed characteristics. If a constitution is to ensure 
the being together of a people, it must be capable of responding to the infinity 
of effect which such being together generates through time. It must, then, be 
incipiently changeful, devoid of any enduring content. This other dimension is 
integrated into the constitutional scheme in such ways as the constitutional 
amendment, judicial interpretation, and horizontal application. These ways are 
characteristically seen as marginal changes in or adaptations of something 
enduringly present. The first, determinate dimension of constitutions, the 
 
9 See Lieberman D The province of legislation determined: Legal theory in eighteenth-century Britain 
(1989) 239. 
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scene of foundation and such, predominates in the occidental thought of 
constitution.10
 
To unsettle, even reverse that predominance, I will call in aid one of 
Mandela’s contributions to Jurisprudence with its matching of these two 
dimensions of constitutional being. On the one side, as it were, there is 
Mandela the relentless and rather well qualified realist critic of the law. This 
was a law all-to-present, all-to-fixed in the oppressive divisions it would create 
and enforce, a law undeserving of any ‘idealistic’ view and beholden only to 
‘the ruling class’.11 His position, however, is more nuanced than either an 
idealist or a realist view. We can see it manifested in his trials. His perception 
of them could hardly have been more relentlessly realist, yet he used the legal 
procedure, along with law’s intrinsic relation to the hearing, to draw a wider 
community into a resistant participation in the law.12  
 
Mandela fuses this positioning with a more general perception that is at 
once theoretical and programmatic. Here we find Mandela now existentially 
identified with the law. In the very midst of a realist critique he lauds the court 
system as ‘perhaps the only place in South Africa where an African could 
 
10 Hence the constitution in its formally instituted or legal sense comes to match something of 
‘constitution’ in its more general sense – not that I will relinquish this ambiguity in the rest of the 
paper. That general sense is intriguingly bifurcated. One strand of meaning, closer to the etymology, 
entails a generative ‘action of constituting, making, establishing’ or the dynamism of ‘a way in which 
anything is constituted or made up’ (The Oxford English Dictionary ‘constitution’ meanings 1.a. and 
4.a.). Despite a prominence given to this sense in The Oxford English Dictionary, the other strand of 
meaning now prevails, at least in occidental usage. The sense is now something set, ‘an ordinance, 
settled arranged, institution’, ‘the system or body or fundamental principles according to which a 
nation, state, or body politic is constituted and governed’ (The Oxford English Dictionary meanings 3.b 
and 7). 
11 Mandela N Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela (1995) 309. 
12 Ibid at eg 384-95 and 428-31. 
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possibly receive a fair hearing and where the rule of law might still apply’.13  
Mandela presents himself before the very law he rejects, ‘rejects in the name 
of a superior law, the very one he declares to admire and before which he 
agrees to appear’; and he does so because he ‘regarded it as a duty which I 
owed, not just to my people, but also to my profession, to the practice of law, 
and to justice for all mankind, to cry out against this discrimination which is 
essentially unjust’.14 Mandela, it would seem is now of an ‘idealistic view’ and 
clean contrary to Mandela the realist, but not so. 
 
The ‘superior law’ which Mandela affirms is not something set apart from 
or something simply about the existent law. Rather, it is integral to law as it is. 
Mandela advances a conception of professional duty which operatively 
respects and admires both the law and its judicial institution, even as the 
pervasive legal oppressions of apartheid are being brought to bear on him.15 
The law which calls forth this magnanimous regard is the law that incipiently 
extends beyond its determinate existence, the law that responsively orients 
that existence towards the possibility of its being otherwise, and towards a 
corresponding possibility of its inclusive and equal extension to all groups in 
South Africa – towards a more inclusively whole South African society.16 In all, 
such responsiveness is intrinsic to law as it is. Law, to be law, cannot be 
contained in its determinate presence.  
 
3. BEING TOGETHER 
 
13 Ibid at 308. 
14 See Derrida J ‘The laws of reflection: Nelson Mandela, in admiration’ (trans. Caws M and Loenz I) 
in Derrida J and Tlili M (eds) For Nelson Mandela (1987) 13 at 27, 35 (his emphasis). 
15 Ibid at 15-16, 33-37. 
16 Ibid at 19-21. Not that one should be Panglossian about this. The return from the responsive to the 
determinate can be ‘very close to the bad, even to the worst’: Derrida J ‘Force of law: The “mystical 
foundation of authority”’ (trans. Quaintance M) in Derrida J Acts of religion (2002) 230 at 257. 
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It should be apt now, in an engagement with constitutions, to offer a theory of 
the constitutive force imported by Mandela’s poignant identification of these 
opposed dimensions – the dimension of determinate existence and the 
dimension of responsiveness to what is ever beyond determinate existence,17 
and that theory is pending; but allow me first to give it an expectant setting by 
returning to the opening problematic of the national and the international and 
the integral relation, and hence indistinction, between them. Here a sliver of 
that relation called international law will be taken as a ‘case’. 
 
Of course the standard constitutive claim here is that international law is 
the utterly dependent creation of nation. This dependence, along with the 
characteristic claim to a sovereign completeness of nation, makes the 
international an impossibility. As Bauman puts it, ‘in a world fully and 
exhaustively divided into national domains, there was no space left for 
internationalism’18 And innumerable international lawyers have followed 
Hobbes for whom ‘the law of nations’ allowed of no overarching rule, no 
commonality of its own, nothing to set against the national Leviathan.19 In the 
result, as one critical commentator puts it, there is ‘a void at the very heart of 
international law which is marked by the myth [meaning falsity] of international 
legal order’.20 The strangeness of all this is condensed in Vattel’s decree that, 
although there could be universal duty binding its members, the society of 
nations was not to involve any of its particular members ‘yield[ing] … rights to 
the general body’: each independent state claims to be, and actually is, 
 
17 This is a reduction stripped of the ethical charge integral to Mandela’s formulation. 
18 Bauman Z Modernity and the holocaust (1989) 53. 
19 Hobbes T Leviathan (1651, reprinted 1952) 159 – chapter 30. 
20 Carty A ‘Myths of international legal order: Past and present’ (1997) 10 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 3 at 10 – his emphasis. 
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‘independent of all the others’.21 This would involve an impossibly pure 
plurality, a plurality of singularities. As Donald Davidson would put it, albeit in 
a different but comparable setting, different entities all relating plurally would 
‘make sense…only if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot 
them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim to dramatic 
incomparability’ and, it could be added, the claim to simple singularity.22
 
With international law this ‘common system’ is most aptly concentrated in 
the so-called doctrine of recognition. In one of its two branches this doctrine 
offers its own explicitly ‘constitutive theory’ in which recognition consists in 
international law constituting nation-particulates, the very entities that 
supposedly constitute it.23 The supremacy of nation is retrieved in the other 
branch of the doctrine, the declaratory or evidentiary theory. Here legal 
recognition of the nation by international law involves ‘merely a formal 
acknowledgment of an established situation or fact’.24 Yet, there could be few 
exercises in sustained academic futility more extensive than the effort to 
define or delimit nation as ‘established situation or fact’, or indeed to define or 
delimit it as anything at all.25
 
Decidedly, then, it is international law which provides Davidson’s 
‘common coordinate system’ – provides the constituent criteria to which the 
‘sovereign’ nation must conform if it is to be ‘recognised’ as having effective 
 
21 De Vattel E  The law of nations or the principles of national law applied to the conduct and to the 
affairs of nations and sovereigns 3 (1916) 9. 
22 Davidson D ‘On the very idea of a conceptual scheme’ in Rajchman J and West C (eds) Post-
analytic philosophy (1985) 129 at 130. 
23 For the ‘doctrine’ and the term see Shearer I Starke’s international law 11 ed (1994) 120 – his 
emphasis. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Fitzpatrick P Modernism and the grounds of law (2001) chapter 4 for a survey and analysis of 
such efforts. 
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existence. There is nothing self-evident, natural or intractable about these 
criteria. Rather, they are criteria derived from the formation of the modern 
occidental nation, criteria peculiarly oriented around an intense attachment to 
landed territory, and as such criteria that would include some modes of 
existence and bluntly exclude others of an at least commensurate 
geographical range and existential affectivity – the vast tributary networks of 
West Africa, for example. As Blomley’s account of the emergence of modern 
landed notions of space shows so vividly for England, nation and law become 
conjointly bound in a space that is itself becoming ‘increasingly rarefied and 
institutionalised’26 - or, in short, territorialised. In that gregarious spirit, The 
Oxford English Dictionary offers an uncertain but revealing etymology of 
territory in which the concept is derived ‘from terrēre to frighten, 
whence…territōrium “a place from which people are warned off”’.27 As well as 
this definable territory, recognition in international law requires a nation state 
to be in effect unitary, autonomous, sovereign, and capable of observing the 
requirements of international law.28 So, in recognising a nation state, in the 
evocation of its existence in terms shared with other nation-states, 
international law constitutes singular entities having the qualities required to 
constitute it.  
 
The outcome, then, can be summarised with alarming brevity as an 
inconclusive constituent alternation between nation and international law. If 
this alternation is to be more than a mere mêlée, then some sense must be 
made of it. That will now be attempted by extracting an existential logic from 
 
26 Blomley N Law, space, and the geographies of power (1994) 69 and generally chapter 3. See also 
Schmitt C The nomos of the earth in the international law of the jus publicum Europaeum (2003) Parts 
I and II. 
27 The Oxford English Dictionary (2005). 
28 There are varying formulations: See Shearer (fn 23 above) 85, 119-20. 
 12
                                                
the imperative of being together, an imperative which is here simply assumed. 
Although I will begin with a general portrayal of this logic, the terminology 
used will connect it to the earlier analysis of the determinate and the 
responsive dimensions of law.  
 
Logically then, and as Davidson indicated earlier,29 with solitary 
singularities no commonality can subsist in an incommensurable diversity. Or, 
in the alternative, if the only allowable possibility remains that singularities in 
common are incommensurable, then the only available commonality would 
require them to be the same as each other and hence entirely 
commensurable. Or we could seek some surpassing truth in which 
singularities were subsumed, and thence singularity would come to its 
antithesis. So, in being together, singularities cannot subsist simply as 
singular, as incommensurable. This is not only because of the common claim 
that any singularity involves a relation in commonality to which singularity 
must give way, at least to some extent. Rather, and paradoxical as it may 
seem, the very existence and maintaining of singularity in being together 
depends upon the dimension of commonality. The alternatives, as we saw, 
entail the loss of singularity either in sameness or in a subsumption to some 
terminal truth. 
 
If, however, singularity is constituently attuned to a commonality, the 
commonality itself has to be responsive to the singularity. Singularity would be 
lost if the commonality on which it depends were enduringly set. The 
determinative elevation of a determinate content to the commonality would be 
iniminical to the illimitable variety of possible relation between singularities 
and to the illimitable responsiveness needed to give affect to possible relation. 
 
29 See fn 22 above and the accompanying text. 
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Yet this commonality, in turn, cannot be passively responsive, an utterly 
receptive vacuity, since that would leave the only available commonality as an 
entirely commensurable sameness, and this would be to deny singularity. So 
there has to be a dimension of determinate content to the commonality.  
 
Law, as we saw, combines these dimensions of the commonality entailed 
in being together. Likewise with nation itself, another mode of being together, 
there is an operative combining of determinate content with a responsiveness 
to whatever may come from beyond what that content is for the time being. 
That responsiveness, given the logic of being together, is illimitable, yet it 
must be integrated into the determinate dimension of nation. It cannot simply 
be the conduit for an occasional and marginal adaptation to the otherwise 
enduring determinateness of nation. Nor, given this necessarily illimitable 
quality of nation’s responsiveness, can it be definitively contained within or 
divided between what is inside nation and what is outside. For there to be the 
determinateness of nation, however, there must be some bordering of the 
determinate, some inside and outside. Yet the pervasive and illimitable quality 
of nation’s responsiveness, as well as nation’s constituent relation to the 
commonalities of the international and the global, result in an indistinction 
between what is inside and what is outside, and we must expect to find the 
same phenomena on both sides of the border.  
 
4 THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 
The new constitutionalism, nonetheless, is typically placed on one side of the 
border, on the outside. From that outside inevitable ‘tensions arise between 
the old constitutionalism and the new’, tensions usually resolved in favour of 
 14
                                                
the new so far as constitutions of the South are concerned.30 Tension is often 
avoided by more compliant national constitutions when, in the so-called ‘race 
to the bottom’ to gather the crumbs of the neo-liberal dispensation, they are 
amended in conformity with it. The Peruvian Constitution of 1993, for 
example, embraces the free market and foreign investment and limits state 
welfare and state economic activity. Critical accounts would, with some 
cogency, see such accommodating changes in ‘old’ constitutions as yet more 
confirmation of the advance of globalisation in the decline of the nation state, 
yet already we see conventional theory creakingly turning from the exaltation 
of globalisation towards a reconfiguration of the insistent nation-state, 
Bobbitt’s account of the emergence and growth of powerful ‘market states’ 
being perhaps the most conspicuous contribution so far.31 Yet, there are more 
‘cosmopolitan’ absorptions of constitutional matter, such as the receptiveness 
of national judiciaries to standards of international human rights,32 and that 
constitutional matter could be seen as effects of the new constitutionalism 
even if the term usually signals some significant presence of capitalist 
economic relations. 
 
Initially I will extract indicative contents of the new constitutionalism from 
an amenable instance, one close to types of national constitutions – the draft 
constitution of the European Union. Since this paper was first presented that 
draft constitution has become moribund in its formal adoption, but it serves as 
a touchstone in decision-making by institutions of the European Union, most 
significantly by the European Court of Justice. So, although there is but a 
 
30 Kelsey (fn 3 above) 511 for the quotation and 512-13 for the point about resolution and for a South 
African instance. 
31 Bobbitt P The shield of Achilles: War, peace and the course of history (2002). 
32 See eg Slaughter A-M ‘A typology of transjudicial communication’ (1994) 29 University of 
Richmond Law Review 99; Slaughter A-M ‘Judicial globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1103. 
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remote prospect of this constitution becoming directly applicable within the 
constitutional scheme of the Union’s member states, it will nonetheless have a 
most profound and enduring impact on them. In one way the draft does not 
look constitutionally exceptional. It has a long and typically self-effacing 
preamble which begins: ‘Conscious that Europe is a continent that has 
brought forth civilisation…’.33 Then follows the kinds of powers and structures 
one would expect in a federal constitution. But there are two remarkable 
differences, both of which tend to typify the new constitutionalism. For one, 
there is a pervasion of economic or, more specifically, market relations. For 
example, the kinds of rights normally found in constitutions combine with and 
reinforce the rights at the core of the European Union. So, in an exalted 
Charter of Rights there nestles the freedom to conduct a business; or the 
charged idealism in such aims as ‘the sustainable development of the Earth’ 
and ‘the eradication of [world] poverty’ sits with the Union’s duty to contribute 
to the cause of ‘free and fair trade’.34 In that spirit, the constitution embodies 
the Union’s prime commitment to the ‘establishment and functioning of the 
internal market’ and to that end it would ensure the ‘free movement of 
persons, services, goods, and capital, and the freedom of establishment’.35  
 
Beside the economic impetus, the other remarkable difference found with 
the new constitutionalism is that the typical constitutional concern with matters 
or aspirations of great import jostle now with numberless matters of seeming 
detail, matters of comparatively inconsequential import, such as a concern 
with ‘promoting co-operation between sporting bodies’ and with ‘protecting the 
physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen’ – which is in itself 
 
33 Fn 7 above, Preamble. 
34 Ibid Part I Title II Article II-76 and Article I-3(4) 
35 Ibid Part I Title I Article I-4(1), Part III Title III Chapter I Section 1 Article III-130(1). 
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may seem puzzling until one remembers the ‘big business’ and general 
corruption associated with sport in Europe.36
 
There are, beside the European Union, broadly similar combinations 
where constitutional matters of a more traditional kind shelter an element of 
capitalist economic relations. The ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ of 1990, 
bringing a formal conclusion to the Cold War, announced ‘a new era of 
democracy, peace and unity’ in which ‘human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law’ are tied to the market economy.37 Human rights also serve prominently 
in ‘The Nine Principles’ guiding ‘The Global Compact’ for cooperation between 
the United Nations and ‘the private sector’.38  
 
The balance between the traditionally constitutional and the economic shifts 
more to the latter with requirements found within programmes of structural 
adjustment or within conditionalities, not just emanating from such as the 
World Bank and the IMF but increasingly attached to agreements for ‘aid’, the 
relief of debt, and trade – many such requirements finding their way into 
constitutions and into institutions usually associated with constitutional 
ordering, and more so of late when these requirements have turned more to 
promoting ‘good governance’. The relevant constitutional precepts divide into 
the guiding axioms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. But what 
is different about these precepts is their explicitly instrumental subordination to 
the new imperialism that is neo-liberalism, to ‘the market’ and to another 
axiomatic trio – liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation.39 In this 
 
36 Ibid Part III Title III Chapter V Section 5 Article III-282(1)(g). 
37 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe http://www.hri.org/docs/Paris90.html  
38 Global Compact http://www.unglobalcompact.org/  
39 A more extensive account of the setting and of these axiomatic trios can be found in Fitzpatrick 
Modernism (fn 25 above) at chapter 6. There is, in the context of constitutionalism, an irony with the 
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relentless instrumental ethos, public institutions are reshaped and realigned in 
response to the most detailed and tentacular requirements of ‘good 
governance’. Neo-liberal economic relations become not just co-present with 
or a contending influence on constitutional matters, but a predetermination of 
and pervasive presence in them. Although the grinding insistence on human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law may at least retain a touch of the 
constitutionally exalted, this new constitutionalism, just like that draft 
constitution of the European Union, has a characteristic concern with the more 
mundane. Its conditionalities and such seep into the minutiae of everyday life, 
either in their own specificity or in the ‘market-led’ existence it promotes: 
organising, or disorganising, for example health services, education, the 
provision of water – the conditioned existence with which Africa is more 
familiar than most. 
 
This account of the new constitutionalism should culminate with the 
instance where its economic thrust achieves the most geographically 
extensive and the most institutionally concentrated constitutional existence, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Given the strength of its provisions for 
enforcement and given its effective judicial apparatus, the WTO’s 
requirements may well increasingly penetrate the national domain, but in 
constitutional terms the most significant for now involve an extension of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) being negotiated within the 
WTO.40 The predominant aim of the exercise is to require nation-states to 
allow non-state actors, including foreign corporations, to compete to perform 
public services. There are twelve categories of services being covered in the 
 
instrumental subordination of the rule of law. In a common usage ‘constitutionalism’ imports 
adherence to the rule of law, but the rule of law is impossible when ‘it’ is used as a conduit for rule by 
something else. 
40 See generally GATSwatch http://www.gatswatch.org/. 
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negotiations: These include education, health and social services, and 
transport. There are also a large number of sub-categories which include 
postal services, scientific research, and rubbish collection. Some might be 
relieved to see that the terms of the negotiation provide that the agreement 
will not apply to governmental services. This relief would, however, be short-
lived because such exempt governmental services exclude any services 
supplied on a commercial basis or in competition with other service suppliers. 
And, of course, these days it is difficult to find a governmental service which 
would fall outside of that definition. In the UK education, for example, 
competes with private suppliers and even ‘public’ education is now at times 
contracted out to the ‘private’ sector. There are prisons run by ‘private’ 
corporations. And so on. Not only would governmental services be opened up 
to competition but barriers to that competition would be prohibited and the 
erection of laws or regulations which might interfere with the ‘freedom’ of that 
competition could be set aside by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. 
This is where the new constitutionalism coming from within meets its 
paradigm location without, the WTO, and the two fuse as one.  
 
If that culmination is linked to the indistinction between the national and the 
international, we should expect that the impact of the new constitutionalism on 
the national domain is, as it were, internally generated also and not confined 
to its intrusion from without. And such mirabile dictu is the case. Taking an 
admittedly stark instance, in the UK there have been extensive 
denationalisations and privatisations. Most functions of local government and 
many functions of national government are now subjected to competitive 
tendering so as to enable private contractors to perform them. There is an 
expansion of private finance initiatives – the intimate involvement of ‘private’ 
capital in governmental projects. Many government bodies concerned with the 
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delivery of services or purely ‘executive’ functions have been hived off into 
semi-autonomous agencies. Decisions about much of national economic 
policy have been transferred to the Bank of England. The involvement of 
private enterprise in the National Heath Service and in public education is 
being governmentally promoted. The health service itself and public education 
to a somewhat lesser extent are being reshaped to fit so-called competitive 
market rationalities. It is perhaps not difficult to relate this to the previous 
discussion of the GATS.  
 
The permeation of the new constitutionalism is also transforming core 
institutions of the traditional constitutional order. With the introduction into 
governmental departments of disciplinary practices associated with 
management in the so-called private sector, we now have the extension of 
managerial responsibility, as opposed to the political, along with modes of ‘line 
management’, detailed budgetary controls, the setting of objectives for 
performance backed by systems of assessment, all of which have contributed 
to what is called a new culture within the public bureaucracy (and all of which 
are oppressively familiar to us in universities). This profound reconstituting of 
nation and society is taking place, taking a place, within traditional 
constitutional forms and structures, and doing so as if it were a marginal 
modification of them. Or that same reconstituting at times takes place, takes a 
place to itself, quite apart from the constitutional traditionally conceived, and 
thence tends not to be seen as having constitutional significance. Yet in both 
places, in their combination, there is an opening out of the constitutional to 
new ways of being, to a detailed reconstitution of society. 
 
5 THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 2 
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Allow me now to invoke sovereignty as a setting for the promised extension of 
the new constitutionalism to matters typically taken to be within the national 
domain. Belated as its entry may appear, sovereignty could have been 
immediately taken as an instance of the logic of being together that has, 
hopefully, sustained the paper thus far. Not only does sovereignty, as we will 
now see, combine the determinate and the responsive dimensions of being 
together but it also embodies and gives effect to occidental formations of 
power in which the determinate dimension would envelop the responsive.41 
Having introduced sovereignty, and national sovereignty in particular, I will 
bring it to bear in locating the new constitutionalism within in the national 
domain.  
 
To concentrate this account of sovereignty I will initially appropriate 
antinomies of sovereignty offered by Derrida – appropriate them more as a 
koan than as bringing his own engagement fully to bear. Sovereignty says 
Derrida ‘is undivided, unshared, or it is not’, yet he would ask: ‘What happens 
when…[sovereignty] divides? When it must, when it cannot not divide?.’42 
There is some merging of these seeming opposites when Derrida talks about 
ipseity in terms of ‘the sovereign and reappropriating gathering of self in the 
simultaneity of an assemblage or assembly, being together or “living 
together,” as we say’.43 Which, none too fortuitously, brings us back to the 
existential logic of being together which I will now abruptly match with 
Derrida’s antinomies. If, then, we return to this logic and to the dimensions of 
commonality, the determinate dimension could be seen as calling for an 
 
41 Of course what I have opened up here is the conceptual containment or reification that endows, some 
would say afflicts, occidental thought. Taking on sovereignty seemed, at this stage of the paper, to be 
adventurous enough. 
42 Derrida J Without alibi (trans. Kamuf P) (2002) xix-xx. 
43 Derrida J Rogues: Two essays on reason (rans. Brault P-A and Naas M) (2005) 11. 
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experientially undivided cohering; the responsive dimension could be seen as 
matching the necessity for sovereignty, like any vital organisation, to 
responsively incorporate and assemble the multitude of disparate forces that 
continually come to reconstitute it. For this projected assembling sovereignty 
must be intrinsically receptive to plurality. To be so receptive, sovereignty 
must always be incipiently vacuous, always capable of emptying any existent 
content. So, appropriating another arcanum, Nancy would find that 
‘sovereignty is nothing’, ‘bare’, an ‘empty place’.44
 
How then does sovereignty combine the stasis of the determinate with the 
evanescence brought about by the responsive? The resolution that concerns 
me here typifies an occidental national sovereignty, the sovereignty of modern 
nationalism. Such a sovereignty, like its exhausted sacral predecessors, can 
marvellously fuse being determinate with a responsiveness prehensively 
subjected to that sovereignty’s unconstrained efficacy. Unlike those 
predecessors, such sovereignty does this without recourse to a 
transcendental reference integrating these two dimensions.45 Rather, this 
sovereign power can enclose itself yet extend indefinitely, subsist finitely yet 
potentially encompass what is beyond its existent content. Through the 
illimitable range of its responsive dimension, the sovereign nation asserts its 
hold on the universal. And for such sovereignty to achieve a constituent 
coherence, this universality has to be integrated with its determinate 
dimension – integrated into emplaced presence, the undivided and unshared. 
I will now return to the new constitutionalism by way of two effects of this 
universal, this sovereign scheme. One has to do with the efficacy of the 
 
44 Nancy (fn 1 above) 36, 147. 
45 For an account of this transition or non-transition and related sources see Fitzpatrick P ‘“What are the 
gods to us now?”: Secular theology and the modernity of law’ (in press) Theoretical Perspectives in 
Law. 
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occidental template of nation, the other with its embedded imperialism. What 
impels the engagement with both effects is, bluntly, that the universal allows 
of nothing beside it. 
 
As for the occidental template of nation, we have already seen how the 
claim to a sovereign completeness both grounds and delimits the sovereign 
nation in its relation to the international. That claim, in effect a claim to the 
universal, enabled the particular nation to assert some ultimate power over its 
own domain. This emplaced universal, however, left nothing beyond it, no 
connecting matter, mediating the relation.46 Hence, as we saw, the 
nothingness, the absence of any place ‘left for internationalism’.47 The new 
constitutionalism, as we have also seen, not only counters that sovereign 
claim through its own constitutional formations outside of the national domain, 
but counters it also by permeating and disaggregating it within. That same 
process is quickening within what is still customarily taken to be the national 
domain. 
 
The national template bestowed by the Occident is the antithesis of that 
process. Its ur-text comprises a set of constitutional pronouncements 
generated by the French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen of 1789 decreed: ‘The Principle of all Sovereignty resides 
essentially in the Nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority 
 
46 Emplaced sovereignty is of course a mysterium tremendum in itself, one that was touched on earlier 
when looking at the sacral character of sovereignty. The claim to an immanence of the universal, the 
claim to embody or exemplify the universal, is a neo-sacral claim: ‘…whenever immanence is 
interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the 
transcendent’: Deleuze G and Guattari F What is philosophy? (trans. Burchell G and Tomlinson H) 
(1994) 45 – their emphasis. 
47 Bauman (fn 18 above) for the same quotation, and see generally the text of this paper above and 
following that note. 
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which does not proceed directly from nation’.48 The Constitution of 1791, 
although short-lived, reaffirmed the abolition of what Montesquieu called 
‘intermediate ranks’ in a way that rendered the political relation as one 
between the now ‘indivisible’ sovereign nation and the citizen.49 This is a 
citizenry politically reduced by the very rights that were to empower it, rights 
that the Declaration announced as ‘natural’ and ‘sacred’ and rights that the 
Constitution rendered ‘natural’ and ‘fundamental’.50 Marx captured the 
constitutional shift in these terms: 
 
Feudal society was dissolved into its foundation [Grund], into 
man. But into man as he really was its foundation – into egoistic 
man 
This man, the member of civil society, is now the foundation, 
the presupposition of the political state. In the rights of man the 
state acknowledged him as such 
… 
The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of 
civil society into independent individuals – who are related by law 
just as men in the estates and guilds were related by privilege – 
are achieved in one and the same act. But man, as member of 
civil society, inevitably appears as unpolitical man, as natural 
man. The rights of man appear as natural rights, for self-
 
48 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen Article 3 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html. 
49 The Constitution of 1791 Preamble Title II and Title III Section 1 
http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history/constitutionof1791.html. An ironic portent of the discussion soon to 
follow involving colonization and indigenous peoples can be found tucked into a rag-bag of 
‘miscellaneous provisions’ right at the end: ‘The French colonies and possessions in Asia, Africa and 
America, although constituting part of the French Dominion, are not included in the present 
Constitution’. For ‘intermediate ranks’ see Montesquieu The spirit of laws (1914) Book III par 4. 
50 Declaration of the Rights of man and of the Citizen Preamble and The Constitution of 1791 Title I. 
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conscious activity is concentrated upon the political act. Egoistic 
man is the passive and merely given result of the society which 
has been dissolved, an object of immediate certainty, and for that 
reason a natural object.51
 
In all, the universal nation would thus occupy and inhibit the generative place 
of the commonality in its recognising the constituent terms of the singularity of 
its subjects. 
 
The reach of the appropriated universal, aptly enough, goes even further 
and would extend to the constitution of carriers of the commonality – carriers 
often taken as originating the formal constitution. To take a mantric instance, 
constitutions very often claim an origin as the emanation of a people, the 
South African constitution being no exception, either directly or, as with the 
French Declaration and the Constitution of 1791, by way of their 
representatives. Yet this very people, in a feat of what Derrida would call 
‘fabulous retroactivity’,52 is a creation of that which it has putatively created, a 
creature of the constitution and of laws made pursuant to it – electoral laws, 
laws to do with citizenship and immigration, laws to do with mental capacity, 
and so on. As with ‘natural man’, this ‘people’ also becomes a manifestation of 
the natural. We say of former outsiders admitted to its ranks that they are 
naturalised. Although the people as a category are more inclusive than the 
erstwhile naturalness of confining the franchise to propertied male citizens or 
to a racial minority, it remains highly restrictive. 
 
 
51 Marx K ‘On the Jewish question’ Early writings (1992) 212, at 233-4 – emphasis in original. 
52 Derrida J ‘Declarations of independence’ (1986) 15 New Political Science 7 at 10. 
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Being excluded from the universal produces a split condition, one that 
follows on from the first effect of the universal scheme of nation just 
considered, the efficacy of the occidental template of nation, to the second, 
the embedded imperialism of that national scheme. The claim to the universal 
generates modern imperialism through a combination of exclusion and 
inclusion. Exclusion is inevitable when the universal putatively subsists in 
some particular such as a determinate nation or empire. What is excluded 
from the universal, then, can only be utterly beyond it, of a totally different type 
of existence. The excluded thence become the object of an imperial 
dispensation and the elect of this diminished world, in another feat of ‘fabulous 
retroactivity’, would ground their hold on the universal through the negation of 
the excluded (a civilized universality in negation of a savage particularity), a 
ground that cannot be secured positively in the particular.53 But the universal 
is all-encompassing, and even if for now it subsists only in its exemplary 
avatars it must be taken to the excluded so that they can come within, if not 
too precipitately. Since the whole apparatus remains premised on a primal 
exclusion, however, that exclusion or some equivalent has to endure. The 
savage has to remain quite unredeemable. 
 
Coming now to the new constitutionalism as internal to nation, and taking 
the first effect of national universalism, the efficacy of the occidental template 
of nation, we come to an inevitable agonism. In its pervasion the universal of 
nation must eliminate or subordinate all ‘intermediate ranks’, yet it must also 
extend incipiently to all that comes from beyond the present existence of the 
determinate nation. These agonistic orientations can coalesce into 
constitutional forms that are of late taking on a greater salience with the 
extension of the new constitutionalism into the internal domain of nation. The 
 
53 See Fitzpatrick P The mythology of modern law (1992). 
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new federalism and asymmetrical federalism were instanced at the outset, 
and of course there have been in recent times a plethora of so-called sub-
national formations asserted or achieved. The nation as repository of the 
universal must ensure that these formations are and remain sub-national. 
Even with the trying case of federations, a centred national sovereignty has 
tended to predominate, although it remains a vexed issue as to where that 
sovereignty may be located institutionally. There is, however, one 
constitutional formation that cannot be encapsulated as sub-national and that 
formation entails the ‘recognition’ of indigenous groupings or of their rights or 
title to land.54 And it is here that we will begin to move from the first effect of 
national universalism, the efficacy of the occidental template, to the second, 
the embedded imperialism of that universalism. 
 
National recognition of the indigenous is professed as remedying the 
injustice done by colonial appropriation, but in that laudable aim lays the 
dissolution of national sovereignty. The sovereign settler state takes its origin 
from the appropriation of the lands of the colonised. The resulting nation, like 
any other, is wedded to landed territory but still claims the universal to itself. 
The land remains held in a deprivation of the colonised and, with yet more 
‘fabulous retroactivity’, that holding and deprivation are founded on the 
transcendent claim to the universal, a claim which in its completeness 
excludes the once colonised from any entitlement. More particularly, this 
 
54 My constrained concern with constitutional formation here should be related to the more extensive 
challenge indigenous assertion presents to the integrity of nation: see Perrin C ‘Approaching anxiety: 
The insistence of the post-colonial in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Darian-
Smith E and Fitzpatrick P (eds) Laws of the postcolonial (1999) 19. It is testament to the intensity of 
this challenge that the Declaration has only very recently, and after twenty years of discussion, been 
approved by the UN Human Rights Council, and then with Canada and Russia voting against approval: 




                                                
comprehensive exclusion, as we have just seen, both constitutes and is 
effected by the emplaced universal, a universal that must also, and contrarily, 
be all-encompassing. Recognition is presented as an extension to indigenous 
peoples of the encompassing national universal, and as such presented as a 
remedying of past ‘discrimination’ and inequality. However, to recognise as 
much, to now include the constituent excluded, would be to destroy the 
sovereign terms of the original and originating ‘settlement’. Minimally, it would 
now involve the opening out of sovereignty to an apposite space of the 
indigenous, embroil it in a plurality, and disintegrate it in the same instant.  
 
It is little wonder, then, that national courts when confronted with this 
nemesis, and when confronted with the disappearance of the ground of their 
own authority, refuse to enquire into the origins of the settler state’s 
sovereignty.55 Such a terminal encounter is avoided by the courts freezing the 
identities, rights and title recognised within a distinctly neo-colonial frame – 
framed comprehensively within, and subject to, the national society and the 
national legal system. Furthermore, the colonial constitution of these 
identities, rights and title is reproduced. That is, these identities, rights and title 
are tied to an invariant, or to a marginally varying, ‘custom’ or ‘culture’.56 
Should these talismans change they disappear along with the identities, rights 
and title made dependent on them. Comparable indigenous claims in South 
 
55 This and the following point are illustrated and discussed for various jurisdictions in Motha S ‘The 
sovereign event in a nation’s law’ (2002) 13 Law and Critique 311; Fitzpatrick P ‘“No higher duty”: 
Mabo and the failure of legal foundation’ (2002) 13 Law and Critique 233; Fitzpatrick P ‘“We know 
what it is when you do not ask us”: The unchallengeable nation’ (2004) 8 Law.Text.Culture 263. 
56 Ibid. The impossibility of such radical stasis should not need to be shown but to indicate the 
dynamism of custom and culture in Africa historically see eg Ranger T ‘The invention of tradition in 
colonial Africa’ in Hobsbawm E and Ranger T (eds) The invention of tradition (1983) 211, and 
currently eg Tamale S ‘Eroticism, sensuality and “women’s secrets” among the Beganda: A critical 
analysis’ (2005) 5 Feminist Africa 9 – also available at http://www.feministafrica.org/05-2005/feature-
sylvia.htm. 
 28
                                                
Africa have met with a broadly similar response. So far, these claims have 
been channelled through legislation providing for ‘restitution or…equitable 
redress’ in respect of property from which people have been dispossessed.57 
By invoking this remedy, there is at least an implicit acknowledgement by the 
claimants that for the case in hand the law of the national government is 
determinative and so sovereignty is not challenged. Even though that 
legislation somewhat attenuates the ascription of a stilled and encapsulated 
identity to indigenous groups, that ascription is nonetheless there and 
operative in the cases.58
 
6 CONCLUSION 
Whether that outcome for indigenous claims is symptomatic of a neo-colonial 
polity, of a sovereignty that stands in a line of succession from its colonial 
antecedents,59 there is no doubt that the liberation of South Africa was 
conceived of as a national project and that thrust has been heightened in the 
constitutions and state-formation of the post-revolutionary period.60 Almost as 
constant as the invocations of nation, however, was the avowed prospect of 
its unifying an oppressively divided society. In this light, it may be indeed apt 
to insist that South Africa as ‘one, sovereign, democratic’61 would want to limit 
or contain division, and the response to the indigenous variant of the new 
 
57 Constitution s 25 (7) and Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
58 See Mostert H and Fitzpatrick P ‘“Living in the margins of history on the edge of the country” – 
legal foundation and the Richtersveld community’s title to land’ (part 1) (2004) 2 Journal of South 
African Law 309 at 316-7, 319, and 329; (part 2) (2004) 3 Journal of South African Law 498 at 502. 
And see Prinsloo and Botha Family Trust v The Ndebele-Ndzundza Community et al. SCA Case 
No.106-2004 pars 29-31, 39. I am grateful to Hanri Mostert for the reference to this case. 
59 See eg, with pointed relevance to the indigenous context, Ramose MB ‘The king as memory and 
symbol of African customary law’ in Hinz M The shade of new leaves: Governance in traditional 
authority: A Southern African perspective (2006) 351. And for something more typically broad brush 
see Pilger J Freedom next time (2006) chapter 4. 
60 See eg Mandela (fn 11 above) 110-13, 438, and 713-14. 
61 Constitution s1. 
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constitutionalism is certainly limiting and containing. Yet in the same light it 
may be questioned whether it is apt to so limit and contain in divisive neo-
colonial terms. The same concentrated constitutional attention is not extended 
to the emanations of the new constitutionalism coming from outside of the 
national domain, but such attention is not greatly evident anywhere else either 
– and that is much of the point of this paper. If the constitution in its 
responsive dimension is not sufficiently vital in engaging with and integrating 
the new constitutionalism, it will become increasingly irrelevant. 
 
The poignancy of that responsive dimension, a dimension essential to all 
carriers of our being together, bears as well on the charge that the South 
African polity remains captive to its antecedents. That polity, however, is not 
just its determinate presence but also its responsive ability to be otherwise – 
and the quality of that responsive ability does deserve attention.62 In 
particular, the Constitution of South Africa invites a generosity of response in 
such provisions as those for its founding ‘values’ and as those contained in its 
Bill of Rights.63 Even more significant, however, is its formation of a 








62 The political trajectory of South Africa’s ‘negotiated revolution’ in its combining of the determinate 
and the responsive, or of continuity and change, is finely perceived by George Lawson in Lawson G 
Negotiated revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile (2005) chapter 4. 
63 S1 and Chapter 2. For the operation of something akin to this dimension in the Constitutional Court 
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